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“Lost in Translation”? Towards a Theory of Economic Transplants 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The rise of economics as one of the main (some will advance the most important) 
“source” of competition law discourse is well documented. This study focuses on a facet 
of the integration of economic analysis in competition law: "economic transplants". The 
term “economic transplants” refers to specific economic concepts that were incorporated 
into the legal discourse by an act of “translation”. They represent the ultimate degree of 
interaction between the legal and the economic systems. Using a paradigmatic approach 
the study examines their specific characteristics and what distinguishes them from other 
forms of integration of economic analysis in competition law. It critically assesses their 
role and their impact on the legal and the economic discourses. It is submitted that the 
“paradigm” of translation (and translation theory) is the most adequate explanatory 
framework for taking into account the dual nature of economic transplants and it can 
also serve, more broadly, to conceptualize the interaction of law with other social 
sciences.  
 
 
Sofia Coppola, Lost in translation, (2003)   
 
“Film Director [in Japanese, to the interpreter]: The translation is very 
important, O.K.? The translation.  
Interpreter [in Japanese, to the director]: Yes, of course. I understand.  
Film Director [in Japanese, to Bob]: Mr. Bob. You are sitting quietly in your 
study. And then there is a bottle of Suntory whiskey on top of the table. You 
understand, right? With wholehearted feeling, slowly, look at the camera, 
tenderly, and as if you are meeting old friends, say the words. As if you are Bogie 
in Casablanca, saying, "Here's looking at you, kid," –Suntory time!  
Interpreter [In English, to Bob]: He wants you to turn, look in camera. O.K.?  
Bob: Is that all he said?” 
 
The interaction of law with economic theory has been an old story
1
. With some 
notable exceptions
2
, the first generation of scholarship interested in the interaction of law 
                                                 
1
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with economics focused on the understanding of the origin and transformation of legal 
rules and institutions through an analysis of the economic conditions and theories of the 
time
3
. The case law occasionally referred to economic theory
4
 in its effort to uncover 
underlying principles of legal change
5
. Legal literature was predominately doctrinal but 
occasionally, in particular since the inception of the realist movement, it was taking some 
form of “external” approach, examining the social, economic, and political landscape that 
was framing legal concepts and discourse
6
. The interaction of law with economics was a 
two-way traffic: legal concepts were also influential in framing economic discourse and 
lending content to economic concepts
7
. Law and institutions were a focal topic for 
economic analysis, which was largely following an inductive and empirical approach, 
based on a thorough analysis of the institutions that influenced the behavior of market 
actors in different industries
8. The emergence of the discipline of “economic law” 
epitomizes the need to take into account the dominant economic principles of the day, 
without however that leading to an abandonment of an internal doctrinal analysis. The 
integration of economic theories in legal analysis was followed by a normative and 
cognitive closure of the (legal) system once economic concepts were juridified
9
.  
The second generation of scholarship on the interaction between law and 
economics did not limit itself to a simple doctrinal analysis. Explicitly adopting an 
“external approach” the literature considered “whether specific legal interventions are 
acceptable when assessed against external moral, ethical, or political principles”10. The 
law and economics scholarship advanced as a criterion the concept of economic 
efficiency, itself framed according to neoclassical economic theory and the idea of 
equilibrium, thus a principle entirely external and disconnected to the legal system. The 
interplay of law and economics acquired a normative interest as a research question, in 
the sense that economic concepts and methods have been directly influential in re-
framing and enriching legal discourse. This evolution has led to an intense debate 
between the defenders of this new paradigm and their opponents. At the same time, the 
Coase theorem led to a certain degree of indifference to legal institutions in economic 
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analysis, one of the basic tenets of the theorem suggesting that when transaction costs as 
low efficiency can be achieved through bargaining, without any contribution from law
11
. 
How could, the “external approach”, transform legal reasoning depends on the degree and 
form of openness of the legal system to external sources. In reality, there are two basic 
options of interaction between law and economic theory: “law either defines itself 
‘through a specific object, approached in an interdisciplinary fashion’ or it ‘makes use of 
a hermeneutical and textual programme which is not [its] own”12.  
The increasing influence of economic discourse was particularly felt in the area of 
competition law. Its main tenets and principles witnessed a profound transformation from 
a systematic recourse to neoclassical price theory as an external source of authority
13
. 
More than in any other field of law, except perhaps the related area of public utilities law, 
competition law is intrinsically linked with the discipline of economics, as this is shown 
by the frequent references of the decision practice of the competition authorities, the case 
law of the courts and the expanding soft law related to the interpretation of the 
competition law statutes to economic concepts and methodology
14
. A common feature of 
this transformation of competition law is the emphasis put on a, mostly synchronic, 
analysis of the welfare effects of the specific commercial practice on consumers or more 
broadly economic efficiency. This is the main thrust of the “more economic” “effects-
based approach” that gained momentum in European competition law with the reform of 
merger control regulation, Article 81 EC and most recently Article 82 and State aids 
control
15
. An important part of the evidence presented in competition law disputes is of 
economic nature, such as consumer surveys, simulation techniques and economic models.  
But economic theory is not only relevant for the adjudication of evidence in 
specific competition law disputes. It has also been increasingly relevant at the “doctrinal 
stage” if one follows Ronald Dworkin’s conceptualization of four stages in legal 
reasoning, to which it could be helpful to refer in order to define the scope of this study
16
. 
Dworkin distinguishes the semantic stage (which relates to the general assumptions and 
practices people share over the concept of law- e.g. criterial, interpretive, natural kind)), 
the jurisprudential stage (the development of a theory of law that is appropriate given the 
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theorist’s answer at the semantic stage, in other words develop the values justifying a 
specific legal practice), the doctrinal stage (where we construct an account of the truth 
conditions of propositions of law in the light of the values identified in the jurisprudential 
stage) and the adjudicative stage (where judges or decision-makers adopt propositions of 
law based on the conclusions reached at the doctrinal stage).  
For example, the economic efficiency versus justice debate that permeates the 
question of the objectives of competition law belongs to the jurisprudential stage as it 
refers to the values (external in this case) that should provide content to the principle of 
coherence in legal interpretation. This important topic will be outside the scope of this 
study, which will instead attempt to focus on the implications of an external approach on 
the doctrinal stage. I will claim that an important implication of the second generation of 
interaction between law and economics is the emergence of economic transplants, that is, 
economic concepts that are “translated” into the legal system at the doctrinal stage. These 
concepts also contribute to the influence of economics at the adjudicative stage. My claim 
is that the paradigm of translation is the most adequate explanatory framework for taking 
into account the dual nature of economic transplants in envisioning the interpretative 
strategy that should be employed. It can also serve, more broadly, to conceptualize the 
interaction of law with other social sciences. The first section will introduce the paradigm 
of translation, which will set the broad theoretical framework of this study, a relation 
between law and economics marked by linguistic and conceptual hospitality. The second 
section will apply this framework in competition law by identifying the main 
characteristics of economic transplants and by distinguishing them from other forms of 
integration of economic concepts in law. The third section will discuss the interpretative 
techniques that preserve the specific characteristics of economic transplants and more 
broadly avoid any risk of hegemonic or deferent translation of economic concepts in law. 
 
I. The “paradigm” of translation 
 
The term “translation” characterizes the process of integration of economic 
concepts in law in the form of economic transplants. A prerequisite for translation is the 
existence of different languages
17
.One could follow Saussure and distinguish the terms 
language (langue) and discourse or use of the language (parole)
18
. I will not do that as I 
will assume, for the moment, that language and discourse are intrinsically linked to each 
other. If one takes this position, the concept of translation is an appropriate term to use 
for my purposes. I will first explore if law and economics are two separate languages (or 
discourses) before examining the concept of “translation”, as a form of communication 
between different systems of discourse distinct from other forms of communication. 
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A. Law and Economics use distinct languages/discourses 
 
I will define the term “translation” as referring to a mode of external inter-
linguistic communication. In his remarkable treatise After Babel, George Steiner adopts a 
wide definition of the term:  
“any model of communication is at the same time a model of trans-lation, of a 
vertical or horizontal transfer of significance. No two historical epochs, no two 
social classes, no two localities use words and syntax to signify exactly the same 
things, to send identical signals of valuation and inference. Neither do two human 
beings”.19 
If a human being performs an act of “translation”, in the full sense of the word, when 
receiving a speech-message from any other human being, the concept has little interest 
for my purposes. I will therefore adopt a narrower definition of the term which will cover 
only inter-lingual translation or translation proper
20. I employ the term “inter-lingual” 
because what matters is the fact that the target language is a different language and/or 
discourse than source language. This will bring me to the difficult question of 
determining if law and economics constitute two different languages/discourses and 
therefore the relation of strangeness (alterité) that exists between them. 
One could determine the existence of two different languages/discourses by 
identifying two separate communities employing a distinct style of talk. One could 
identify a language community by the distinct techniques its members use from other 
communities. Economics has been recognized as a different scientific discipline 
relatively recently (since the end of the 18
th
 century) when it was gradually transformed 
from moral philosophy to political economy
21
. Joseph Schumpeter in his monumental 
History of Economic Analysis famously asked “is economics a science?”, before 
answering that “since economics uses techniques that are not in use among the general 
public, and since there are economists to cultivate them, economics is obviously a science 
within our meaning of the term”22. He identified these techniques as being essentially 
three: economic history, statistics and theory (explanatory hypothesis) to which he added 
in a later edition of his volume economic sociology, which form, what he calls, 
“economic analysis”. These tools frame the style of talk that distinguishes the scientific 
economist from all other people who think, talk and write about the same (economic) 
topics.  
This group has not always employed that specific style of talk. Schumpeter remarked 
that jurisprudence is relevant to a history of economic analysis, first of all because, to a 
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considerable extent, economists have been jurists “who brought to bear the habits of the 
legal mind upon the analysis of economic phenomena”; He gave the example of the 
sociological and economic systems of the scholastic doctors of the 16
th
 century which 
were “primarily treatises on the political and economic law of the Catholic Church” and 
whose technique “was derived primarily from the old Roman law as adapted to the 
conditions of the time”23. However, in many respects, the style of talk of this community 
of scholars evolved differently from that of those self-defined as jurists.  
During the period Schumpeter wrote his treatise the tool of statistics was a language 
not employed by the community of lawyers, which made Schumpeter conclude that it 
was a distinguishing element. But is this still the case today? A more diachronic approach 
will indicate that statistics have now become a tool of legal scholarship (empirical legal 
studies). Can we therefore still claim that law and economics employ two different 
languages? Or, has the style of talk of economists, evolved so that the language of law 
and the language of economics remain still distinct from each other? 
Schumpeter was telling only part of the story. Starting with the programme of “social 
mathematics” of Condorcet24, (political) economists such as Canard, Cournot, Bertrand, 
Walras, Jevons, Edgeworth, Marshall and their followers, progressively recognized 
mathematics as the predominant style of talk of the community self-defined as 
economists
25
. Of course, the tool of mathematics has greatly evolved since the calculus 
used by Cournot to game theory and topography but the hypothetico-deductive system of 
mathematics forms the backbone of “scientific” discourse in economics. In her seminal 
study of the “rhetoric of economics”, Deirde McCloskey observes that “the economic 
conversation has heard much eloquent talk, but its most eloquent passages have been 
mathematical”26. Since the 1930s, economists have become enchanted by this “scientific” 
way of thinking. The alliance of mathematical economics and neoclassical price theory in 
the 1950s with the development of a mathematical proof of the general equilibrium 
theory still dominates, at some respects, the field, at least economic theory applying in 
competition law
27
. The same trend towards mathematization can be observed in other 
social sciences during the same period, a byproduct of the diffusion of game theory
28
. 
Not everyone in economics agrees with this particular trend. Tony Lawson has in fact 
defined the “nature of heterodox economics” in opposition to economic orthodoxy or 
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mainstream economics that he closely identified to the “mathematising inclination” or the 
formalistic-deductive framework of mathematics
29
. One could distinguish, for reasons of 
conceptual clarity, the claim of mathematization and that of formalism of economic 
analysis.  
Economic theory followed closely mathematical developments, starting “with the 
elements of differential calculus and linear algebra and that gradually called on an ever 
broader array of powerful techniques and fundamental results offered by mathematics”30. 
In his seminal analysis of the evolution of Walrasian general equilibrium theory, Ali 
Khan observes the influence of the mathematical tools that were progressively integrated 
and have framed economic theory
31
. Khan notes that the evolution of economic theory 
was function of the new tools that mathematics developed from differential calculus to 
convex analysis and non smooth analysis
32
. The integration of convex analysis led to 
game theory and further developments in the field
33
. Debreu gives the example of 
nonstandard analysis to claim that “the lag between the date of a mathematical discovery 
and the date of its application to economic theory decreased over time”34. One could thus 
expect the evolution of economic theories, once new developments in mathematics are 
translated into the language of economics. One could thus claim that mathematics 
becomes the Reine sprache of economics and a means of dialectic interaction between 
the community of mathematicians and that of mathematical economists
35
, the new 
guardians of the Economic Theory Temple. Mathematics ensures precision and openness 
to scrutiny for logical errors. It is par essence a universalistic language, closely related to 
the imaginary of “economic physics” and its ideal of a “unified science”36. It is allegedly 
ideology free
37
.  
Yet, the translation of mathematics into economics is not without important 
implications on the content of economics. The translator moves from one linguistic 
medium to another. It serves two masters: the source language and the target language. 
There is a risk that the form of one language influences/deforms the content of the 
message transmitted by the other. It is impossible to avoid a tension between economic 
                                                 
29
 T. Lawson, ‘The Nature of Heterodox Economics’ (2006) 30 Cambridge Journal of Economics 483-505, 
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30
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content and mathematical form. The only partial cure is the “axiomatization” of the 
theory: 
“An axiomatized theory first selects its primitive concepts and represents each one of 
them by a mathematical object. […] Next assumptions on the objects representing the 
primitive concepts are specified, and consequences are mathematically derived from 
them. The economic interpretation of the theorems so obtained is the last step of the 
analysis. According to this schema, an axiomatized theory has a mathematical form 
that is completely separated from its economic content. If one removes the economic 
interpretation of the primitive concepts, of the assumptions, and of the conclusions of 
the model, its bare mathematical structure must still stand”38. 
Indeed, the mathematical inclination of economics transposes itself to the use of 
models and formalization
39. “Theory means models and models mean ideas expressed in 
mathematical form (language)”40. Although one cannot deny that there are different 
discourses in economics (some of them declining the use of mathematics, such as the 
Austrian school) and that even in mainstream economic theory there is diversity of styles 
of talk, the mathematizing inclination is certainly a common feature of modern 
economics. Heterodox economics’ slow integration to the mainstream paradigm follows 
the pace of their conversion to the mathematizing inclination.  
This axiomatization may be understood as a response to the absence of “a secure 
empirical base”, which may have led economic theory to emphasize “internal logical 
consistency”, through “methodological formalization”41. Formalism could in this case 
take the form of “self-contained rule following”, which would employ formal language 
and “deductive systems that are independent of content”42. The recourse to the concept of 
equilibrium
43
, the divorce until recently of the study of economic behavior from 
behavioral sciences’ input44, or the “narrowness of homo oeconomicus’s concerns (the 
assumed separability of economics from politics and social philosophy, the absence of 
altruism, the lack of context” constitute the side effects of this axiomatization and formal 
logic
45. Contrary to “axiomatic reasoning”, “ordinary reasoning” authorizes “several 
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 Ibid., at 1265. 
39
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Journal 1859-1869, at 1859. 
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45
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different starting points, each impinging on the subject from a different angle and 
bringing different knowledge to bear”46. 
The fact that mathematics constitutes the language of economics has profound 
implications on the story of economics, that is, economic discourse. What is formalizable 
can be subject to economic inquiry; what is not, is excluded from the focus of the 
discipline. Debreu observed that as “the very choice of the questions to which he (the 
theorist) tried to find answers is influenced by his mathematical background”, “the 
danger is ever present that, economics will become secondary, if not marginal, in that 
judgment”47. In other words, the natural constraints of the language restrict the topics of 
conversation, its narrative. This is a profound consequence of modernist thought of which 
economics is a step child. Modernism views science as axiomatic and mathematical. In 
the modernist view considerations of efficiency and justice should be separated: “they 
form churches with separate devotees: each can specialize in one kind of argument”. “But 
arguments do not cross: this year’s GNP is one thing; an axiom of social choice is 
another; sympathy for the poor still another”48. 
Modernist tradition is also present in legal discourse. How could one otherwise 
understand the fury with which arguments of economic efficiency were welcomed by 
some quarters in legal academia
49
? The value of economic efficiency was dismissed and 
ridiculed. Efficiency talk is wrong, a utilitarian blasphemy in the Temple of Justice
50
. The 
fact that this efficiency talk was coming from apostates, lawyers converted to economic 
discourse, suspect of ideological bias, their efficiency talk being a scientific masquerade 
of a profoundly libertarian political agenda, finished by concealing the essence of the 
argument. To the rhetoric of numbers and optimization, lawyers responded by the 
rhetoric of values and morality, using their favorite weapons, those of hermeneutics
51
. 
But in essence, their argument had also a profound modernist taste: law is about justice, 
not about efficiency; these concepts should be separated. If efficiency was not to be a 
valuable consideration, it was probably because law did not have the adequate language 
to apprehend it without risking a profound reconsideration of its internal values and 
premises. These values are allegedly wider than those traditionally pursued by 
neoclassical economic theory. The increasing anxiety of evidence law scholars to the 
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introduction of probability theory and methods of mathematical proof in evidence theory 
may also illustrate how issues of discourse and language are interrelated with each 
other
52
. 
Deductive reasoning and abstraction is certainly not absent also from legal 
discourse. The positivistic model of law aimed to transform the discipline to a proper 
scientific field. The search for coherence in law participated to this “quest for natural 
science status”53. Geoffrey Samuel convincingly argues that “the association of law with 
scientific rationality”, a legacy of civilian legal history, “marks an epistemological shift” 
and could be understood as a quest for a new source of authority, other the authoritative 
texts of Roman law: “[…] for the jurists who succeeded the medieval doctors one part of 
the authority was to be found in the ‘scientific’ or systematic coherence of law because 
this rationality provided not just the deductively valid solutions but, in doing this and thus 
freeing judging from subjective bias, the very authority that gave law its validity”54. 
“Law was a system, analogous to mathematics, consisting of axioms from which all other 
norms, together with the solutions to case law problems, could be logically deduced”55. 
Christopher McCrudden also notes how “legal academics are constantly constructing 
explanatory ‘models’ from the legal material at their disposal, models that they then test 
against that legal material”56. Nevertheless, the movement of axiomatization and 
formalism in law has never achieved the perfection and success it has achieved in 
economics. What some authors mocked as the “Heaven of legal concepts57”, where 
prediction, the cornerstone of scientific pretense, of how courts decide cases was finally 
possible through abstract analysis and deductive thinking, was quickly shattered by the 
challenge of Interessenjuriprudenz
58
 and the functionalism of the realist movement
59
. 
Mathematics could never become the language of law. 
The different techniques/styles of talk employed by the communities of lawyers 
and economists inevitably led to their perception as forming separate social sub-systems. 
This is a profoundly constructivist approach. Social construction of reality is not also 
absent from systems theory or autopoietic theory, to which I will refer in order to build 
the argument
60
. Scientific knowledge, as any other knowledge is being shaped in a 
complex social process. It is therefore equally important to examine how scientific 
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knowledge is actually constructed
61
 and follow rigorously the historical development of 
theories
62
, in order to convey the deep sense of the translated discourse than to adopt a 
purely internal to the discourse approach. The development of a discourse supposes the 
existence of a shared meaning and common beliefs in different communities forming 
different social sub-systems. One could indeed conceptualize the domains of law and 
economics as two distinct self-contained and self-referential autopoietic social systems or 
sub-systems (if one looks to their common origins in moral philosophy
63
), employing a 
distinct discourse/language (style of talk/rhetoric). For example, the concept of rationality 
could take a different form in the context of economic discourse than in legal discourse
64
. 
A characteristic of autopoietic systems is that communications occur mainly within the 
system itself, not with the outside world.
65
 One way to conceive it is to think of the 
existence of different conversations going on at the same time within different groups of 
interlocutors. Once the conversations get started, they have their own script, which 
participants of other groups that may occasionally participate to these conversations 
cannot alter. 
Nevertheless, each sub-system does not ignore all others, nor is there always a 
situation of incommensurability between the two discourses. Autopoietic social systems 
are cognitively open to their environment, despite being normatively closed.  
The self-containedness of auto-poietic social systems means that foreign 
discourse cannot enter directly into the script/programme of another conversation. “Each 
system reconstructs its own image of the external system within itself”66. This preserves 
the complexity of each environment but may also lead to incommensurability, because of 
different sets of normative values that operate within each system (“environment”) that 
blur understanding and communication without the necessary coding. The development 
of some degree of incommensurability between the two discourses is inevitable. A 
normative closure and areas of untranslatability emerge
67
. However, interpenetration 
ensures that each system will be cognitively open: legal and economic discourses may 
mutually influence each other. As D irdre Dwyer explains “this would mean that one 
believes that it is possible to agree on statements about the external world with people 
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from another social group , but that statements about values cannot be directly 
translated”68.  
The interaction between each system does not take only one direction: e.g. 
economics influence law but legal discourse should also influence the production and 
directions of economic discourse for the interpenetration of the systems. Indeed, 
“interpenetrating systems exist when this occurs reciprocally, that is when both systems 
enable each other by introducing their own already constituted complexity into each 
other”.69. Interpenetration is of course a matter of degree and may follow specific cycles: 
for example, although early jurists played an important role in formulating the methods of 
different social sciences
70
, including political economy, this was followed by a period 
where each community of scholars evolved differently.  
A possible explanation of this different direction could be the different 
“paradigms”, that is the “epistemological orientation”, “kinds of reasoning”71 or “a body 
of attitudes or behaviour”72 of the main actors of each discipline: social sciences 
allegedly follow a paradigm of inquiry that “subjects research to means of validation” (if 
one follows Popper), while law embraces an “authority paradigm”, “in which 
epistemological validity arises not from scientific inquiry but uniquely from authority”73. 
The sources of this authority have obviously changed and could be summarized as the 
ideal of legal coherence with some from of textual reference, Grundnorm or some 
principle of moral philosophy, even to the price of some distance from social reality. 
However, even if one adheres to this broad description, it is clear that the 
principle of coherence is also of central importance to axiomatized modern economics. 
Empiricism and falsification are largely absent from economic theory. Much of economic 
theory is not based on empirical research but on “a fairly abstract, sometimes 
unverifiable, and largely mathematically derived conclusions about human behavior”.74 
The dominant paradigm in economic theory remains Friedman’s instrumentalism, where 
the only validity test is the comparison of predictions with experience
75
. What counts is 
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the theory’s predictive adequacy and simplicity, not necessarily the correspondence of its 
assumptions with reality. The “paradigm of authority” plays therefore a central role in 
economics as well. Furthermore, such a sharp dichotomy between the “authority 
paradigm” and the inquiry one ignores that judges will also “be sensitive to the 
consequences of any decision”76. The court’s decisions should be perceived not only as 
epistemologically true [some sort of justified (true) belief] but also as persuasive, even to 
actors outside the legal sub-system.  
Yet, what matters for a legal system’s legitimacy is that those subject to the 
judicial decisions believe that the court adequately explained its decision so that the 
losing party recognizes it as “a valid”, yet unfavorable, “exercise of judicial authority”77. 
The accent is put more on the process of decision-making, rather than on the outcome, 
seen from the point of view of some external reality or principle. Outcomes certainly 
matter and the perception that a legal rule leads to unacceptable consequences, in terms 
of public policy, could eventually lead to its revision. However, the authority of legal 
reasoning is not directly linked to the acceptability of such outcomes, from an external, to 
the discipline, perspective.  
One could advance a similar point with regard to economic theory, where 
outcomes outside the strict confines of the discipline do not matter. For example, one of 
the aims of the ordinalist revolution in economics was to clear economics from any 
reference to psychological assumptions: the concept of cardinal utility was abandoned 
and replaced by the concept of a scale of preferences.
78
 This was linked to a shift in the 
acceptable methods of observation. In the words of Lionel Robbins, 
 “valuation is a subjective process. We cannot observe valuation. It is therefore 
out of place in a scientific explanation. Our theoretical constructions must assume 
observable data”.79  
The rejection of cardinal utility led also to the extrusion from economic analysis of 
behaviourist psychology, a “queer cult”.80 The question that economics should attempt to 
answer was, according to Robbins, “choice under scarcity”, scarcity being “the scarcity 
of given means for the attainment of given ends”.81 The agent’s preferences are a “given” 
which economists have to identify in order to analyze consumer choice. The concept of 
revealed preferences further attempted to ground the theory of consumer behaviour on 
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observable concepts and to suppress any reference to psychology and introspection.
82
 The 
models established lacked, however, any correspondence to reality and were proved 
ultimately inapt (and illegitimate) for public policy prescription, an area where the role of 
economists was expanding
83
. This led contemporary economic theory to attach greater 
attention to inputs from psychology.
84
 The psychological trend, that is witnessed in many 
recent economic movements, such as behavioural law and economics, experimental 
economics, neuro-economics, transforms economics into a sort of cognitive science, 
where economic behaviour is reconceived on the basis of “psychological facts” 
discovered with the method of experimental introspection. Economics and economists are 
in search for new sources of translation than mathematics and the more “reality-proof” 
cognitive sciences constitute a popular candidate. The advanced hypothesis is that 
economics becomes more reactive to the pressure of reality the more it attempts to 
occupy the terrain of policy prescription and analysis and produce consequences to actors 
outside the specific sub-system. Consequently, this raises the broad issue of authority. 
This pressure is not yet as strong as that generally faced by the legal system, but it may 
explain the importance attached by recent economic theory to more realistic 
assumptions
85
. In conclusion, the authority versus inquiry dichotomy does not take into 
account the broad social context of the evolution of social sciences. 
One should also account for the fact that the “quest for truth” has a different 
purpose in science (social science included) than it has in the law and the courtroom
86
, 
which might explain the different evolution of each separate sub-system. It is thought that 
the objective of the scientific method is not to legitimate the power of scientists but to 
increase the stock of “objective knowledge”, in other words to discover more about the 
world. In contrast, the quest for “truth” in the courtroom is to arrive to an ultimate, in the 
sense of persuasive, explanation, in terms of legitimate exercise of authority.
87
 Ultimate 
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explanations exist in the sense that they are defined by the courts.
88
 This is not the case in 
the process of scientific discovery, as “every explanation may be further explained”, in 
the sense that a known state of affairs may always be explained by an unknown state of 
affairs.
89
 In other words, “objectivity” and “truth” may be the aim of both the scientific 
and the legal process but the nature of “objectivity” or “truth” that they aim to uncover is 
of a different kind. 
Once we accept that law and economic form two distinct sub-systems in 
interaction with each other, it is important to discover how interconnection and cognitive 
openness operate between them. 
First, one could argue that when an autopoietic system of discourse is brought into 
being, it brings with it some of the elements of broader social discourse that it made use 
of before it became normatively and operationally closed. It is possible to argue that all of 
us participate at the same time to different conversations or games if we prefer this 
metaphor. The participants to these different conversations (an individual can belong to 
more than one disciplines) may bring to the conversation information acquired from other 
social sub-systems to which conversations they also participate.
90
 This is how facts, 
concepts, methodologies and theories may spread over time from one specialist system 
into another or the society in general.
91
 This establishes the ground rules of social 
communication between the different systems, a kind of meta-language. The existence of 
a tertium comparationis or metalanguage is also a common feature of some theories of 
translation. Walter Benjamin defended the view that translation implies a pure language 
(reine Sprache or Mentalese), which will allow the passage from language A to language 
B by ensuring that both are equivalent to an expression in metalanguage C
92. Chomsky’s 
“generative grammar”93 derives from a similar intellectual tradition, what Ost 
perceptively titles “Babel aboli: langues parfaites et autres langues imaginaires”94. One 
could subject this view to criticism, as it is possible to argue that in order to decide if A 
and B are similar in meaning to a text in language C, one needs a new metalanguage D 
etc…(the “Third Man Argument”)95. 
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Second, it is possible to argue that all of us participate at the same time to 
different conversations or games if we prefer this metaphor
96
. Being participants to 
different conversations (an individual can belong to more than one disciplines) we may 
bring to the conversation discourse acquired from other social sub-systems to which we 
participate. This is how concepts and normative generalizations may spread from one 
sub-system over time into other specialist systems or the general society.  
Third, some could argue that language and discourse are marked by relations of 
power, hegemony and authority represented in the different sub-groups employing it: 
translation is thus more than a simple technical exercise of transfer of meaning
97
. Some 
actors in several sub-systems may acquire a specific status or power in the host system 
that they are able to be perceived as the “official” translators of cognitive signals coming 
from the exterior and thus influence the choice of the source language to translate. Would 
antitrust have evolved differently, if a sociologist or a psychologist was appointed 
Assistant attorney general of antitrust instead of economist Donald Turner in 1965, 
Turner being instrumental for the inception and publication of the 1968 merger 
guidelines, the first systematic application of economic concepts in antitrust law 
enforcement? Laurence Sullivan has once wondered about the existence of different 
sources of wisdom in antitrust than economics and offered a possible alternative
98
. 
Economics cannot be the only source of wisdom for competition law. 
In conclusion, autopoietic theory brings attention to the separate beliefs that may 
animate the actors of the different sub-systems. These may be the consequence of the 
specific limitations of their language techniques and consequently the story and script of 
their conversation. One could therefore distinguish between legal and economic 
discourses: in the sense that the topics examined and the style of the conversation differs 
in each discipline. It follows that the meaning of a term/statement may be different if one 
takes it in isolation from the conversation to which it is integrated. I could give the 
example of polysemic concepts, such as “property rights”, which are present in the 
vocabulary of both disciplines but have a different meaning. This is more the object of 
study of pragmatics (which examines the influence of context on the interpretation of an 
utterance) than of translation, which, I should first hypothesize, emphasizes the transfer 
of meaning from one language/discourse to the other with the aim of equivalence in 
meaning (deep sense). 
 
B. The aim of translation 
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If translation refers to a transfer of meaning/significance from a source language 
to a target language, its aim is to convey meaning, to express the deep sense of a parole 
(discourse). In that sense, the act of translation is a concept different from the act of 
communication or distorted communication, which does not necessarily involve the 
objective of the transfer of meaning or deep sense. No one shows this better than Lewis 
Carroll in Alice Adventure’s in Wonderland. The beings inhabiting that country 
understand Alice’s language, more or less, but the inhabitants of this place do not engage 
in meaningful (in terms of structured) exchanges with each other. Opposing this world to 
the paradigm of argumentation that he advances, Chaim Perelmann observes that 
“between Alice and the inhabitants of Wonderland, no hierarchy, precedence, or 
functions requires one to answer rather than another. Even those conversations that begin 
are apt to break off suddenly”99. 
One could also distinguish translation from interpretation. Translation can be 
considered as a limited type, “a species of interpretation governed by certain principles 
proper to translation”100. Interpretation involves a certain degree of correspondence to the 
original text, a constraint that is not faced by translation. In translation, there can be no 
correspondence between the two texts. George Steiner notes that  
“the complete translation, the definitive insight and generalization of the way in 
which the translated language relates word to object would require a complete 
access to it from the translator. The latter would have to experience a total mental 
change”101. 
It follows, that there is no identity between the language source and the language 
target, rather some loose sort of equivalence of meaning. The translator is therefore free 
to change the story (content). She must decide what is the fundamental content conveyed. 
As Eco explains, “in order to preserve a deep story, the translator will be entitled to 
change the surface one”102. Translation is a form of “inter-systemic interpretation with 
marked variations in the substance of the expression”103. Nothing better illustrates that 
than the translation of the title of Umberto Eco’s book Experiences in Translation from 
Italian to French and to English. The title of the book in Italian is “Dire quasi la stessa 
cosa, esperienze di traduzione”, which was translated in French “Dire presque la même 
chose : Expériences de traduction”. The first part of the title has disappeared in the 
English edition. Indeed, translation is “dire PRESQUE la même chose” (Emphasis 
added). Translation involves a constant negotiation between different meanings without 
aiming to correspondence of meaning. Once one renounces to the “very ideal of the 
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perfect translation” begins the “work of mourning”, that is, exposing oneself to the “test 
of the foreign”104. 
But if translation does not aim to formal correspondence (in both form and 
content), what constitutes its aim? 
A possible option could be “dynamic equivalence”, that is, “equivalence of 
response” or “conformance” of the translation to the receptor language and culture as a 
whole”105. It is thus possible that the aim (“skopos”) of the translator is to reach “a set of 
addresses” in the target culture: “the target text […] is oriented towards the target culture, 
and it is this which ultimately defines its adequacy”. It follows that “source and target 
texts may diverge from each other quite considerably, not only in the formulation and 
distribution of the content but also as regards the goals which are set for each, and in 
terms of which the arrangement of the content is in fact determined”106. Reflecting on our 
discussion of the interaction between law and economics, this indicates that the quest for 
correspondence/equivalence of the economic concept integrated in legal discourse with 
some ideal form of “sound economics” is a futile exercise. The domestication of the 
foreign text is not without limits. The translator mediates between the author and the 
reader: “to translate is to serve two masters: the foreigner with his work, the reader with 
his desire for appropriation”107. In some instances, the translation will maintain the 
foreign character of the translated message by indicating its linguistic and cultural 
differences from the culture of the target language (foreignizing translation).  
In essence, the aim of the translation is to link two heterogeneous communities 
around the translated text. Its aim is to foster “a community of readers who would 
otherwise be separated by cultural differences” but also to establish “a community that 
includes foreign intelligibilities and interests, an understanding in common with another 
culture, another tradition”108. The objective of economic transplants is therefore to create 
this “linguistic zone of contact between the foreign and translating cultures”109, in our 
case between the rhetoric of law and the rhetoric of economics. 
 
II. The emergence of economic transplants in competition law 
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Having by now defined the meaning of translation, I will analyze the interaction 
between legal and economic discourse in the area of competition law, from the 
perspective of the paradigm of translation. I will first examine the different forms that 
may take the incorporation of economic discourse into legal discourse, before focusing 
on a specific form, economic transplants, which fits perfectly with the paradigm of 
translation that I came to expose. 
 
A. The many faces of economic analysis in competition law 
 
The judge or legal decision-maker has different options in the incorporation of 
economic analysis into legal discourse.  
He may choose to delegate the translation task to an “expert”, someone who is well 
versed into the economic discourse, who will attempt to provide an explanation of its 
deep meaning to the judge. The task of translation will be performed by an expert 
witness, a court-appointed expert, an assessor, a single joint expert. The “epistemic 
asymmetry”110 that exists between the judge and the economic expert renders necessary 
the delegation of the translation task to the expert. The judge recognizes that the concept 
belongs to a different discourse, that of economics, and does no effort to domesticate it 
within his own discourse. There are many reasons why a judge will decide to appeal to an 
“expert” of economic discourse. 
Economic discourse constitutes an importance source of inspiration and authority for 
the judge in enforcing competition law (economic authority). For example, one of the 
major implications of the evolution of competition law towards an economic approach 
has been the importance of normative economic arguments and theories for the 
interpretation of what constitutes a restriction of competition. The terms “restriction of 
competition”, “abuse of dominant position” or “significant impediment of effective 
competition” have no content on their own unless the interpreter has recourse to certain 
economic considerations, such as consumer welfare, economic efficiency, unilateral 
effects, coordinated effects, collusion etc…The judge needs therefore to have access to 
economic expertise, which will give to this body of law its muscle.  
It is clear that the judge will be influenced by economic authority as well as by legal 
precedent in enforcing the competition law provisions. This is particularly the case in 
situations where there is no consensus in the legal or in the economic community over the 
adequate competition law standard that will apply to a business practice. Chicago theories 
about economic efficiency gains, the post-Chicago theories of anticompetitive harm for 
vertical mergers and foreclosure, such as raising rivals costs theory, theories about 
incentives to innovate are increasingly framing the debate over the adequate competition 
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law standards for certain commercial practices. The Courts look implicitly or explicitly 
“to economic authority in order to establish antitrust authority as a matter of law”111. 
However, one should not conceive economic discourse as being marked by 
uniformity but as a discourse characterized by numerous sub-discourses, schools, theories 
etc. Often, these theories rest on first assumptions for which there is no consensus in the 
self-defined community of ‘economists”. The choice of the expert will therefore have 
important implications on the act of translation. As I indicated previously, each 
translation will be different as it is the outcome of an interpretative inference that can or 
cannot be shared by everyone. Each translator will inevitably emphasize different parts of 
the original discourse. 
The recent US Supreme Court case in Leegin on the continuous validity of the per se 
interdiction rule for resale price maintenance may illustrate the variety of translations and 
therefore the difficulty of the task of the judge
112
. During the oral hearing, an interesting 
dialogue occurred between Theodore Olson appearing for Leegin and Justice Breyer. 
Olson claimed that it will only be in an economic context where retailers dispose of a 
strong market power that resale price maintenance will most likely lead to 
anticompetitive effects. He based his argument on the Chicago school’s assumption that 
the interest of supplier and consumers are always aligned and on the need to preserve a 
dealer’s promotion efforts from free riding. This assumption has been questioned by a 
number of other economists who claim that vertical restraints and, in particular, resale 
price maintenance, may lead to consumer harm
113
. Justice Breyer, a fine connoisseur of 
antitrust and regulatory economics, was quick to observe: 
“Breyer: “Which economists? I know the Chicago school tends to want rule of 
reason and so forth. Professor Sherer is an economist, isn’t he? Worked at the 
FTC for a long time? A good expert in the field…And his conclusion is, as in the 
uniform enforcement of resale price maintenance, the restraints can impose 
massive anti-consumer benefits. Massive…” 
Olson: “In the vast majority of the economist who have looked at this have come 
out to the opposite conclusion, Justice Breyer” 
Breyer: “We ‘re supposed to count economists? Is that how we decide it? 
(Laughter)”114. 
One could understand the challenges of decision making on the basis of 
conflicting economic expertise that follows different assumptions and different 
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inferences. Because of the epistemic asymmetry problem, the judge is not able to assess, 
by her own, the “loyalty” of the translation to the original. It is not also clear how the 
“loyalty” of the translation will be examined, if it is not by another expert, which 
inevitably will raise the “Third Man Argument” (e.g. a third expert to verify the loyalty 
of the second expert’s decision over the loyalty of the first one and so on). Loyalty may 
also matter a little, at the end, if one perceives the two discourses as separate, closed sub-
systems. But we know that, in reality, this is not the case. The choice of a specific 
economic discourse by the legal system will have profound implications on the 
conversation that takes place between economists by conferring on some schools the 
authority and support of the legal apparatus and weakening others by rendering more 
difficult the recruitment of devotees to their church. 
In other circumstances, the judge will not have to choose between different 
translations, as there is a broad consensus in economic discourse. This is particularly the 
case for economic facts: statistical data (firms’ sales, turnover, sales in the industry, 
economies of scale…) or economic concepts widely used by the profession, such as 
opportunity costs, variable costs, fixed costs, average avoidable costs, incremental costs. 
These data are based on observations, which are ultimately theory laden
115
. There is 
however generally a broad consensus between economic experts on their meaning. This 
consensus does not include the inferences that are drawn from the data by the use of 
statistical methodology, in other words, the concept of economic facts includes 
descriptive statistics but excludes inferential statistics
116
. The involvement of the judge is 
limited in these cases to the decision to take into account this economic context in the 
qualification of the facts of the case. If the judge decides to take into account the 
economic context of the dispute, these economic facts will be established empirically by 
experts. The degree of epistemic asymmetry will reach its peak: the expert does not only 
have superior knowledge, in comparison with the judge, of the statistical methods that 
will be used to collect and to present the data but has also spent time in collecting and 
associating these specific data to the economic context of the particular dispute.  
One could also identify circumstances where economic theories are universally 
accepted not only by the overwhelming community of economists but have been 
incorporated into the general social system: economic laws
117
. The layman or non expert 
judge comprehends their meaning without any need for translation. These concepts form 
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part of the common code of the legal and economic sub-systems. In the most extreme 
scenario, economic laws are well enshrined in all different forms of discourse and take 
the form of “common sense”. For example the idea that market power may produce 
allocative inefficiency is based on the perfect competition model, which could be 
conceived as a specific expression of the economic law of supply and demand. As Mark 
Blaug remarks in his Methodology of Economics this is not a natural law, like the 
Universal Law of Gravitation, which can be tested (Blaug adopts a Popperian 
perspective), but relies instead on hypothesis and assumptions such as the Invisible Hand, 
the rationality postulate and constitutes a partial model of equilibrium. Economic laws 
may be subject to questioning by contrary empirical evidence. For example, recent 
advances in experimental economics demonstrate that real consumers are sometimes 
guided by their perceptions of fairness rather than by economic factors such as marginal 
utility, even when they make clear economic choices
118
. 
However, despite these challenges, economic laws form part of general 
experience and there is no need for them to be established and explained by experts. 
Epistemic asymmetry between the judge and the expert is in this case minimal, almost 
inexistent. One could advance that these economic laws are integrated at the 
jurisprudential stage or as Learned Hand called them, “general truths derived from 
specialised experience”119. One could certainly question the universal validity of these 
general “truths”. These economic laws form, however, an indistinguishable part of the 
legal and economic nexus. For example theories that question the “economic law” of 
supply and demand will have little chance of being accepted as valid economic authority 
in competition law. The judge will automatically exclude this type of economic expertise, 
based on her experience of the tensions that would exist between this economic testimony 
and the basic assumptions that lay the economic foundations of her legal system. 
 
B. Economic transplants in competition law 
 
The task of translation may not be entirely delegated to an expert economist but part 
of it could be accomplished by the legal decision-maker/judge. This constitutes an 
important characteristic of economic transplants. Economic transplants also convey the 
decision to integrate explicitly economic analysis, not only at the adjudicative stage (as 
was the case with economic facts and economic authority) but also at the doctrinal phase, 
where they operate as guiding principles for all decisions adopted at the adjudicative 
stage. I will now examine the emergence of economic transplants before analyzing the 
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reasons that explain why the effort of translation has not been entirely delegated to 
experts. 
 
1. The emergence of economic transplants 
 
The term “economic transplants” refers to any concept of economic discourse that 
has been incorporated into the legal discourse by an act of translation performed by an 
organ vested with the authority to adjudicate and capable therefore of producing an 
impact on the interpretation of legal norms. Economic transplants constitute in most cases 
analytical concepts, such as market power, barriers to entry, consumer welfare, efficiency 
gains, that are essential intermediary steps in the process of qualification of the facts of 
the case as constituting, for example, a restriction of competition, under Article 81 EC, or 
an abuse of a dominant position, under Article 82 EC. Economic transplants are most 
frequently incorporated in legal discourse by soft law instruments, such as guidelines. 
Eleanor Fox’s aphorism “the guidelines are when economists are kings” provides an 
adequate explanation for the role of soft law
120
. Economic transplants are not usually 
incorporated for the first time in hard law instruments, such as regulations, which employ 
instead descriptive, not analytic, concepts (such as market shares, the latter being proxies 
for the concept of market power)
121
. 
This situation should be distinguished from all those where expert economic 
evidence “crystallizes into legal standards that are applied in subsequent cases”122. 
Barbier de la Serre and Sibonny give the example of the concept of collective dominant 
position, framed progressively by the case law on the basis of economic evidence 
presented to the European Courts on the theory of tacit collusion. It is important to 
observe that the Courts did not adopt the economic concept of tacit collusion but 
preferred instead to develop a new legal concept, collective dominant position, thus 
breaking any link between this new concept and its economic underpinnings. This is not 
the case for economic transplants, where the choice of an equivalent denomination to that 
employed in economic discourse emphasizes the economic origins and nature of the 
transplant. One could consider that this choice indicates a canon of interpretation 
addressed to the legal community – Do not ignore that this concept also belongs to a 
separate discourse! The recent effort by the European Commission to integrate as a 
substitute or complement to collective dominance the economic concept of coordinated 
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effects indicates that economic transplants are there to stay. This led to a dialogue 
between the European Commission and the European courts, which are less prompt to 
integrate economic discourse, most probably because of their composition by lawyers 
only. The Courts attempted to integrate the economic transplant of coordinated effects 
into their own legal concept of collective dominant position, without abandoning the 
later. 
An interesting feature of economic transplants is that their interpretation is not always 
function of the exact meaning of the concept in economics. In that sense, they share a 
common characteristic with the concept of “legal transplants”.  
For Alan Watson, as legal systems develop, they are constantly borrowing concepts 
or approaches from other legal systems
123
. This possibility is denied by Pierre Legrand 
for whom legal rules may travel but legal meanings and cultures do not
124
. At best, these 
concepts take on a form and life of their own, as they are immersed into their receiving 
environments
125
. The concept of economic transplants refers to a borrowing of economic 
concepts through an act of translation. However, for any good translation, even if there is 
some degree of equivalence between the language hospes and the hostis, there may be 
important differences: as Umberto Eco illustrated a propos of the translation of his novel, 
The name of the Rose, the same Italian text may be translated differently in Russian, 
German or French
126
. The economic transplant takes a different form as soon as it is 
translated: its content evolves separately than in its original setting, it evolves in 
congruence with the context of its host language.  
In competition law, economic transplants were predominantly integrated by the 
instrument of soft law (Guidelines)
127
. This followed the path of US antitrust law. 
Starting with the 1968 Guidelines on Merger Enforcement, US antitrust law integrated 
different economic concepts that became influential in framing antitrust law discourse in 
courts
128
. 
Hillary Greene’s important study on the institutionalization of US merger guidelines 
in antitrust discourse provides an excellent example of the integration of economic 
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transplants through the instrument of guidelines
129
. Greene gives the example of 
concentration measures in merger control in order to illustrate the impact of the 
guidelines. Prior and shortly after the 1968 US Guidelines on merger control, the Courts 
employed the four-firm (CR4) concentration measure in merger analysis, representing the 
sum of the market shares for the four largest firms in the market
130
. In 1982, the DOJ 
revised its 1968 guidelines and introduced a new measure of concentration, the 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (called HHI), which is the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of the firms present in that market
131
. Hillary Greene observes that the HHI index 
was discussed in economic circles, since at least the early 1960s
132
, when George Stigler 
published his seminal work on oligopoly theory
133, and that it “became part of the 
mainstream legal literature” following the suggestions of the law professor, then judge, 
Richard Posner
134
. She observes, however, that the case law on Section 7 of Clayton Act 
(the US merger statute) has ignored the HHI index until the 1982 Guidelines were 
adopted
135
. Prior to that date, case law was written almost entirely in terms of CR4 or 
other concentration ratios. Immediately after the adoption of the 1982 Guidelines, a 
transition period started during which both CR4 and HHI concentration measures were 
relied by the courts, although the later gained progressively a more important role
136
. She 
also notes the important increase of the rate of references to the guidelines since the early 
1970s. In conclusion, the adoption of new version of Guidelines profoundly influenced 
the direction of the case law (hard law). According to Greene,  
“from around 10-15% in the 1970s the reference rate increased to 15-20% in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. In 1983 shortly after the adoption of the 1982 Guidelines were 
issued, the reference rate increased to above 50% and by the late 1980s the rate 
averaged 60% or higher. After the 1982 Guidelines were issued, merger guidelines 
quickly became the “basic reference point” in section 7 Clayton Act rulings”137. 
The Small but Significant Non Transitory Increase in Price test (SSNIP) illustrates 
also the role of guidelines in transplanting an economic concept in legal discourse
138
. The 
test measures cross-price elasticity between two products through a speculative 
experiment postulating a hypothetical small but lasting change in relative prices [5-10%] 
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and evaluating the likely reactions of customers to that increase. The test was first 
developed by American economist Morris Adelman in an article published in a legal 
journal in 1959
139
 and then reformulated by American economist F.M. Scherer in an 
expert testimony he presented at the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan during April 1972 before including this test in the 1980s edition of his 
industrial organization textbook
140
. The test found its way in official antitrust legal 
discourse when economist Lawrence White used it in the 1982 DOJ Merger Guidelines, 
in his capacity of chief economist of the DOJ Antitrust Division
141
. This proved 
extremely influential in US courts, which, prior to the 1982 Guidelines, were employing 
in merger control the definition provided by the Brown Shoe case law of the Supreme 
Court, which emphasized functional characteristics for market definition
142
. Since 1982, 
cross-price elasticity and the SSNIP test has gradually acquired prominence in US merger 
control discourse before migrating to Europe. 
The European Commission referred to cross-price elasticity in its Eurofix-Bauco 
v. Hilti decision in 1987
143
. The decision was later reviewed by the ECJ
144
. The 
Commission argued that its emphasis of cross-price elasticity was a “synthesis of all the 
factors that determine whether or not two different products can properly to be said to be 
in the same relevant market, according to the previous case law of the Court”145. The ECJ 
repeated its previous case law emphasizing product characteristics and interchangeability 
(a functional approach based on its Continental Can case law
146
) but found the 
Commission’s decision “sufficiently clear and convincing” to carry its belief147. The 
SSNIP test had been employed in other occasions by the Court
148
, before it was formally 
incorporated by soft law at a doctrinal stage in 1997
149
, as the first step of the 
“modernization” effort of EC competition law, in other words, the attempt to put EC 
competition law in conformity with neoclassical price theory and economics, in the late 
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1990s
150. The Courts’ reaction was not initially very positive. In Colin Arthurs Roberts, 
the applicants argued that consumers distinguish between pubs and clubs based on the 
difference of the price of beer (the price of beer in bars is 82-83% of the price of beer in 
clubs), which demonstrated, according to them, that consumers of beer in pubs will not 
switch to consume beer in clubs if there was an hypothetical increase of the price by 5-
10%
151. The applicants relied on the Commission’s Market Definition Notice. The Court 
rejected this argument and although it cited the Notice, it also considered the previous 
case law on market definition in the beer sector (the Delimitis case) which emphasized 
structural factors
 152
. For the Court, the applicants relied on the single criterion of price 
difference and disregarded a specific feature of the sale of beer, which is that 
“consumption of beer in establishments selling it for consumption on the premises does 
not depend essentially on economic considerations” but influenced “primarily by their 
environment and atmosphere”153.  
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However, the Court has, in subsequent cases, explicitly and systematically cited 
the Commission’s Notice, in particular in the merger area, but also beyond154. There are 
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now an increasing number of cases where the Courts adopted the SSNIP definition (see 
table 2) culminating in 2006-2008 towards an institutionalization of the SSNIP test as the 
main test for market definition in the case law of the Court. The Commission has also 
incorporated in its Notice the so called “cellophane fallacy”, which advises against 
employing an SSNIP test based on prevailing market prices for abuse of dominance 
cases, as “the prevailing price has been determined in the absence of sufficient 
competition”155.  
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In conclusion, economic transplants should be distinguished from economic 
authority, as it is the legislator (an actor of the legal sub-system) that defines their content 
and use, while at the same time the legislator notes the foreign character of the concept, 
by employing the same term as that employed in economics, thus emphasizing their dual 
nature, in other words, their mutual appurtenance to the separate sub-systems of law and 
economics. This provides an important guidance for the interpretation of these concepts. 
But, it may also explain how the same economic concept may take various forms when 
immersed in different legal systems. With regard to the SSNIP test, the European 
legislator defined the percentage of price increase that has been since employed for the 
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hypothetical experiment (5-10%)
156
 at a different level than that chosen by the US 
legislator (5%)
157
, although it is not clear if the SSNIP test requires a relative increase in 
the price of one, some or all of the products in the candidate market (aggregate diversion 
ratio) in the case of multi-product firms
158
 and there is considerable variation of the 
emphasis given to supply or demand-side factors in practice
159
. These differences are 
often motivated by policy preferences which are external to economic discourse. The 
policy maker may aim to favor infra-marginal instead of marginal consumers, thus 
adopting a lower threshold for market definition, generally, or in certain specific 
circumstances
160
. 
But why the policy –maker or legal adjudicator does not delegate the task of 
translation to an external (to the legal system) expert, as it is the case for economic 
authority?  
 
2. Economic transplants and the translator’s aim 
 
Economic transplants have a dual nature. They belong to both legal and economic 
discourses. This constitutes the principal motivation for their adoption: the aim is to build 
a bridge with a “foreign” culture, a shared space between the distinct communities of 
lawyers and economists; inscribe the concept with the intelligibilities of both discourses. 
Establishing this shared understanding supposes a link between the legal process and the 
scientific process. 
Sheila Jasanoff observes how the interaction between legal and scientific 
discourse does not take only one direction (e.g. economics influence law), but legal 
discourse or legal institutions also influence economic discourse
161
. She eloquently 
highlights how “the law today not only interprets the social impacts of science” but also 
“constructs” the very environment in which scientific discourse comes to have “meaning, 
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utility, and force”162. Research is conducted and interpreted to answer legal questions and 
the content of scientific knowledge is shaped in a complex social process, which includes 
the legal sub-system as well as the specific scientific discourse. Judicial decision-making 
exercises an important influence on the definitions of “good science”, therefore affecting 
at the same time the content and direction of economic discourse. 
An illustration of the profound interaction between legal and economic discourses 
is the emergence of economic “schools of thought”, a way to conceptualize and 
rationalize ex post legal doctrine and authority in the area of competition law. If 
explanatory features of economic discourse, such as schools of economic thought, 
become also explanatory features of legal discourse, this strongly illustrates the profound 
interaction and mutuality between these two forms of discourse in competition law. This 
approach of conceptualizing the evolution of competition law doctrine indicates that 
institutionalised “schools” or “networks” play an important role in antitrust law, if not 
always, during the process of formation of competition law doctrine, at least at the stage 
of the ex post conceptual rationalization of the case law and therefore its subsequent 
interpretation. 
It follows that the decision by the legal decision-maker to maintain authority by 
incorporating the economic transplant into the legal discourse (and therefore not by 
delegating the authority to “external” experts) is explained by a broader regulatory aim: 
impact as much as possible on the evolution of both legal and economic discourses. But 
what, more precisely, would be the regulatory aims followed by the legal translator?  
First, with regard to the impact on legal discourse, the translator may attempt to 
distinguish the specific transplant from an existing economic transplant incorporated into 
the legal system of another jurisdiction. In other words, the aim of the translator is to 
render explicit the specific objectives followed by her legal system. This implies that, as 
for legal transplants, economic transplants do not have a similar content when 
incorporated in different legal systems, even if the economic concept from which they 
both originated is similar.  
Second, with regard to the impact of the translation on economics, the translator may 
also wish to preserve the variety of economic discourse: in other words to preserve her 
legal system from the influence of a dominant trend in economics, which, for different 
reasons, does not address or does not correspond to the objectives (preferences) of her 
legal system or more broadly is so dominant that suppresses any other competing form of 
discourse within economics (in case the regulator values diversity and competition in 
economic theory)
163
. In this case, the regulatory intervention will aim to preserve variety 
in the marketplace of ideas.  
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(a) The impact of economic transplants on legal discourse 
 
Economic transplants are often preferred to economic authority, as they enable the 
integration in economic discourse of the objectives of the specific legal system, in 
comparison with other legal systems. In this case, the definition of the content of the 
transplant, or even the form of integration, may indicate the specific nature of the 
economic transplant, in comparison to similar economic transplants integrated in other 
legal systems. The economic transplants of “market power” and “consumer welfare” 
exemplify this impact. 
 
(i) Market power 
 
The integration of the concept of market power in competition law is an illustration of 
the growing importance of economic transplants in competition law discourse. The 
following tables make more explicit the expansion of the concept of market power, 
measured by the total number of citations to “market power” in court cases, 
Commission’s decisions, guidelines and regulatory texts relevant to competition law 
(based on research conducted with Westlaw and LexisNexis). 
 
Market power
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1977-80 1981-84 1985-88 1989-92 1993-96 1997-00 2001-04 2005-08
Period
C
it
a
ti
o
n
s
Citations
 
 
The next table details these citations according to the area of competition law. The 
concept of market power plays a dominant role in the area of merger control. The 
reduction of the number of citations of the concept of market power in cases or 
 34 
documents related to antitrust (articles 81 and 82) does not mean that the relative 
importance of the concept has decreased in this area. What has decreased is the number 
of total competition law cases based on Articles 81 and 82 brought by the European 
Commission during that period (in particular during the period 2002-04, probably as a 
result of the economic crisis following the dot-com bubble burst in 2001) and the 
decentralization of competition law enforcement during that period. 
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An interesting feature of economic transplants is that their interpretation is not 
always function of the exact meaning of the concept in economics. A typical example of 
this asymmetry is the different conceptions of market power in competition law and in 
economics
164
. The neoclassical definition of market power has always focused on the 
ability of a firm to raise prices profitably and reduce output, which essentially fits to the 
competition as an efficient outcome approach
165
, whereas the legal definition of 
market/monopoly power has always emphasized the ability of the firm to exclude 
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 For a further analysis, see I. Lianos, La Transformation du droit de la concurrence par le recours á 
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 For an interesting comparison of the different original definitions of market/monopoly power in law and 
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competitors and to affect the competitive process, a definition that fits well with the 
competition as a process of rivalry paradigm
166
.  
The concept of dominant position in EC competition law has been predominately 
inspired by the second approach, as it insists on the ability of the firm to maintain 
independent behaviour from the other actors of the market system rather than on market 
outcomes. The classic definition of the concept of dominant position within the meaning 
of Article 82 is found in the ECJ’s judgment in the United Brands case, and refers to   
“a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers 
and ultimately of consumers”.167 
The broad definition of dominant position as essentially an ability of independent 
behaviour made possible the consideration by the Court of a variety of sources of 
economic power, including the power to exclude competitors (exclusionary economic 
power) or purely relational economic power because of the existence of a situation of 
obligatory partner and economic dependence
168
.  
The position of EC competition law has nevertheless evolved towards more 
convergence with an outcome based approach. Article 2 of the former EC Merger 
Regulation 4064/89 employed the concept of dominant position but linked it more 
directly than the previous case law on Article 82 to the concept of effective 
competition.
169
 In order to define the existence of effective competition, one should look 
to indications of performance as well as of market structure. In other words, effects on 
the market count. Relying on this effects-based approach, subsequent case law broadened 
the concept of dominant position in order to cover situations of coordinated effects. It 
was not clear if the concept could, however, be extended to cover unilateral effects. This 
led to the implementation of a new substantive test in EC merger control, the significant 
impediment of effective competition test. According to Regulation 139/2004, the 
criterion of dominant position serves now as a simple indication of a significant 
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impediment of effective competition and therefore of the existence of a potential harm to 
consumers.
170
 A deeper understanding of this evolution will, however, advance that the 
alleged unilateral effects “gap” was not the principal reason for the institution of the new 
substantive test in EU merger control
171
; the main motivation can be found in the need to 
provide tools to both the legal and economic communities to work together de novo in 
framing the content of the new substantive test, without being subject to the constraints of 
the previous case law on dominant position. In other words, the significant impediment of 
effective competition test recognizes the need for translation. 
In its most recent documents, the Commission embraced this more economics-
oriented definition of the concept of dominant position in other areas than EU merger 
control. The staff discussion paper on Article 82 illustrates this subtle evolution:  
“[T]he definition of dominance consists of three elements, two of which are 
closely linked: (a) there must be a position of economic strength on a market 
which (b) enables the undertaking(s) in question to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on that market by (c) affording it the power to behave 
independently to an appreciable extent”.172 
Of particular importance here are the last two elements, which, according to the staff 
discussion paper, are intrinsically linked. The discussion paper reveals the nature of the 
relationship between these two elements of the dominant position, that is, the idea of 
independent behaviour and the concept of effective competition and brings closer than 
ever this concept to the economic conception of monopoly: 
“The notion of independence, which is the special feature of dominance, is related 
to the level of competitive constraint facing the undertaking(s) in question. For 
dominance to exist the undertaking(s) concerned must not be subject to effective 
competitive constraints. In other words, it thus must have substantial market 
power”.173 
Market power, or substantial market power, is the missing thread that operates as 
the unifying concept for the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC and the introduction of 
a more economics-oriented approach in justifying antitrust intervention on the 
marketplace. A capacity of independent behaviour with regard to the competitors and 
consumers is not a sufficient criterion for the finding of a dominant position. The 
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discussion paper adopts, instead, an approach that is closer to the definition of market 
power by neoclassical price theory (the ability to raise prices profitably and reduce 
output). The recent Commission Guidance on its Enforcement Priorities in Article 82 
(hereinafter Commission Guidance) adopts an equivalent formulation but further 
emphasizes the link with neoclassical price theory:  
“[t]he Commission considers that an undertaking which is capable of profitably 
increasing prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time does 
not face sufficiently effective competitive constraints and can thus generally be 
regarded as dominant”.174 
The convergence of the economic and the legal definition of monopoly power or 
dominant position is not, however, complete. While the definition of the concept of 
market power adopted by the Commission Guidance as well as the recent non-horizontal 
merger guidelines presents similarities to the economic concept of market power, its 
scope is broader. In a similar formulation for Articles 81, 82 EC and EC merger control 
purposes, the Commission defines market power as “the ability of one or more firms to 
profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and services, 
diminish innovation, or otherwise negatively influence parameters of competition”175. 
This broad definition accommodates the emphasis of EC competition law on the 
protection of the competitive process and consumer sovereignty. Although the ability to 
increase price stays the primary concern of competition law, in conformity with the 
neoclassical price theory approach, the emphasis on other parameters of competition than 
price, in particular consumer choice, epitomizes the broad definition of what constitutes a 
restriction of competition under EC competition law and the recognition of the 
importance of quality and variety investment competition instead of just price 
competition
176
. 
In contrast, US courts have not generally included as an equal consideration other 
parameters than price in the definition of market power and in their assessment of 
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anticompetitive effects: non price competition has been a concern in some US cases but 
still remains a secondary concern or it is even not mentioned in others
177
.  
There has been a considerable debate in the US case law also on the different 
sources of market power that are taken into account. For historical reasons, European 
competition law has given equal consideration to exclusionary and relational sources of 
market power than the ability to control price by restricting its own output. This is not the 
case in the US, where Stiglerian market power (insisting on the ability of a monopolist to 
restrict his output) has been a more important concern than Bainian power (where the 
source of market power is the ability of a firm to raise the costs and therefore reduce 
output of its competitors)
178
 or relational market power
179
.  
This example illustrates that, economic transplants are influenced by the legal 
environment to which they are integrated and by the specific objectives pursued by the 
legal system. The same economic concept, market power, may have a different content 
when it is transplanted in EC competition law than in US antitrust law. As Robert Bork 
has once perceptively remarked, “antitrust is necessarily a hybrid policy science, a cross 
between law and economics that produces a mode of reasoning somewhat different from 
that of either discipline alone”180. This is due to the effort made by the policy makers and 
adjudicators to interpret economic transplants in conformity to the preferences of their 
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legal system. The discourse is still presented as economic in nature, as the choice of the 
expression “market power”, instead of the legal concept of “dominant position” or 
something else, shows. But the economic transplant is domesticated. The legal system 
“reconstructs its own (legal) image of the external system within itself”181. It follows that 
even if two sub-systems use the same terms, they may understand them in different ways. 
For example, one could identify two different normative values that shape economic and 
legal discourse with regard to the definition of market power. If the purpose of the 
economic analysis of market power is to highlight a change in the current equilibrium of 
supply and demand, the ultimate purpose of legal discourse is to assign to this economic 
“factual” nexus of market power the coding of either lawful or unlawful or put 
differently, of interest for competition law intervention versus of no interest for 
competition law intervention. It follows, that if the economists do not hesitate to declare 
that every firm benefits from a degree of market power, in the sense that they have the 
ability to increase the price profitably to at least a category of consumers, this cannot be 
relevant for legal discourse, as only a certain kind or degree of market power will be 
qualified as “unlawful” or “of interest”. This may also explain the different content given 
to the economic transplant of market power by each legal system, as internal 
considerations to the system - Is the regulator more risk averse to false positives or false 
negatives? ; What is the acceptable level of substantive (error) costs?
182
, play an 
important role. 
 
(ii) Consumer welfare 
 
The integration of economic transplants in legal discourse may also aim to 
transform the legal order. This may succeed or not, depending on the ability of the 
translator to attract the support of the most powerful actors in the formulation of legal 
rules and legal interpretation, the courts. The concept of “consumer welfare” may provide 
some insights. 
Consumer welfare denotes the idea that following the change from an equilibrium 
situation to another, the consumers of the specific product will benefit from a surplus 
and/or wealth transfer, in the sense that their ability to satisfy their preferences will 
increase. The choice of consumer welfare as an objective of competition law has 
distributive consequences. This concept is generally distinguished from the concept of 
total welfare that takes equally into account the benefits collected by other societal 
groups, such as the shareholders of the firm that adopts the specific commercial practice 
under investigation (consumer and producer surplus). 
In competition law, the incorporation of consumer welfare as a valid objective of 
competition law implies that the outcome/consequences of a specific practice on 
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consumers matters, before any decision on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of this practice 
has been reached. A reduction of competitive rivalry, following the exclusion of a 
competitor or an agreement between two competitors to cooperate with each other, will 
not be found unlawful, if they do not also lead to a likely consumer harm/detriment. A 
different approach would be a deontological emphasis on competitive rivalry, irrespective 
of any actual or potential consequences of a specific practice/conduct on consumers. 
Effects may indicate empirical observable findings on the worsening, in terms of price or 
quality, of the situation of specific groups of consumers, following the adoption of the 
anticompetitive practice (actual effects). It may also refer to situations where there are no 
observable findings of effects on these groups of consumers but there is “a consistent 
theory of consumer harm” which is empirically validated; That is, “the theory of harm 
should be consistent with factual observations” (ex ante validation) and “that the market 
outcomes should be consistent with the predictions of the theory” (ex post validation).183 
The theory of harm has the objective to establish a relation of causality between the 
specific practice and the consumer detriment. One could think in terms of a probability-
statement, that is, an evaluation of the “inferential soundness” of this relationship184, or in 
terms of relative plausibility of the specific consumer harm story
185
. 
I will not discuss here the relative merits and of the possible integration of the 
concept of consumer welfare in EC competition law, which could be the subject of a 
specific study. The philosophical foundations of the concept
186
, as well as the 
methodology of revealed preferences that has permitted its measurement
187
, are put into 
question by scholars that criticize “equilibrium economics188” and economic thinking 
emphasizing “social preferences”189, endogenous preference formation190, more realist 
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assessment of consumer behavior
191
, thus leading to an integration of social, behavioral 
and institutional constraints in conceptualizing consumer choice
192
. 
The concept has been introduced rather recently in competition law discourse, 
again through the means of guidelines and other soft law texts. The term first appeared in 
EC competition law discourse in 1997, at the Green paper on vertical restraints, marking 
the debut of the “modernization” of EC competition law193. Interestingly it also figures in 
the agreement between the European Commission and the US on the application of 
positive comity principles in the enforcement of competition law, adopted in 1998
194
. The 
US government was following with great interest and encouraged the progressive 
transformation of EC competition law towards an economic approach. Following the 
publication of the guidelines on vertical restraints the concept spread to other areas of EC 
competition law, such as the transfer of technology agreements
195
, some Article 81 EC 
cases
196
, some merger cases
197
 and then the horizontal merger guidelines in 2004
198
, the 
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guidelines on the application of Article 81(3)
199
, the white paper on damages actions in 
2008
200
 and most recently the Commission Guidance on Article 82 EC
201
. 
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Its integration in EC competition law has been carefully designed and 
progressively, found its way in the case law of the European Courts. The term has been 
first used in the context of the case law of the European Courts, by Advocate general 
Jacobs in his Opinion in SYFAIT in 2004 when he examined the economics of 
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector
202
. The ECJ did not address that issue in its 
decision as it declined to respond to the preliminary question sent by the Greek 
competition authority, the later not being formally a court under Article 234 of the EC 
Treaty. The concept then appeared in the Microsoft decision of the CFI in 2007 but only 
in a reference to the decision of the European Commission that was reviewed by the 
Court
203
. The concept took a more prominent role in the recent Opinion of AG Trstenjak 
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in Beef Industry Development in September 2008
204
. The Advocate general adopted a 
theory according to which Article 81, paragraph 1 and Article 81, paragraph 3 take into 
account different aspects of “consumer welfare”: 
“…the general conception of Article 81 EC is to ensure the optimal supply of 
consumers. However, different aspects of consumer welfare are taken into 
account under Article 81(1) EC and under Article 81(3) EC. Under Article 81(1) 
EC, agreements which restrict competition between market participants and thus 
its function of supplying consumers optimally with a product at a lowest possible 
price or with innovative products are prohibited in principle. Such agreements 
directly affect consumer welfare and as such are prohibited in principle
205
. 
The Court did not accept the position of AG Trstejnak and did not refer to the concept of 
“consumer welfare”206.  
The reaction of other members of the Court has not taken long to manifest. In her 
recent Opinion in T-Mobile, Advocate General Kokott defended a different perspective: 
“Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only 
or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors or 
consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such 
(as an institution). In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because 
where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to 
be feared”207.  
The Advocate general considers that the concept of anticompetitive object covers 
two forms of practices: first, practices that have a direct impact on consumers and the 
prices paid by them, referred to by the parties as practices affecting “consumer welfare”, 
and second, practices that have an indirect negative impact on consumers by restricting or 
distorting competition
208
. Advocate general Kokott takes care of not employing the term, 
preferring instead a descriptive account of the form of the impact on consumers. At the 
doctrinal stage, she takes care of moving away from economic terminology and economic 
transplants. First, she refers to the public interest of undistorted competition, indicating 
that maintenance of rivalry remains an important concern. Second, she suggests a limiting 
(outcome-based) principle to the scope of Article 81(1) and the process-based definition 
of competition she advocates, which is, however, extremely ambiguous: “the objective of 
European competition law must be to protect competition and not competitors, because 
indirectly that is of benefit also to consumers and the public at large”209. The reference to 
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the “public at large” seems to expand the beneficiaries of the principle of competition 
enshrined in Article 81(1) beyond the category of final, or even, intermediary consumers, 
thus implicitly questioning the utility of the concept of “consumer welfare”. The Court of 
Justice accepted the formulation of AG Kokott, although it carefully omitted any 
reference to “the public at large”, thus opening the possibility that this judgment could be 
interpreted as adopting a long term vision of “consumer welfare” or being inspired by the 
principle of “consumer sovereignty”210. 
What these examples show is that the integration of the economic transplant of 
“consumer welfare” along traditional objectives of EC competition law, such as market 
integration or the protection of the structure of competition, illustrate the effort made by 
the policy makers to render the interpretation of the competition law provisions of the 
Treaty more compatible with recent economic discourse. For some, the new economic 
discourse should set aside old principles. For others, the newly imported economic 
discourse should complement the existing values and principles. The instrument of 
economic transplant is flexible enough to accommodate both possibilities. 
 
b. Economic transplants as a means to preserve the variety of 
economic discourse 
 
The concept of “barrier to entry” is of particular importance in EC competition 
law for the definition of a relevant market (barriers to existing competition) as well as for 
defining the existence of a restriction of competition in Article 81 or of a dominant 
position in Article 82 EC (barriers to potential competition). There has been a 
considerable literature on the economic concept of barriers to entry. In the neoclassical 
tradition of competition as an end-state, a barrier to entry is a market factor that prevents 
entry from occurring in the long run. The economists are generally interested in 
determining whether there is an equilibrium in which entry will or will not occur: 
deterrence of entry, not simple delay of entry is of concern. By contrast, lawyers think of 
barriers to entry as factors that permit either substantial periods of monopolistic pricing 
(competition as an end-state) or factors that permit exclusion of competitors (competition 
as a process of rivalry), thus including factors slowing entry. Therefore, the competition 
lawyer’s interest “is not limited to those situations where the social loss caused by the 
monopolistic pricing is infinite, but where it is too large by some measure which is 
entirely a function of public policy” (e.g. the regulator’s preference on the degree of 
openness of markets). The incorporation of the concept of barrier to entry into different 
legal systems will therefore not produce similar effects. The concept may have a different 
meaning in US antitrust law from what it has in EC competition law and it may be 
different in competition law than it may be in the European trade law. 
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Even within the paradigm of neoclassical economics, there are many traditions of 
the concept of barrier to entry. I will focus here only on two basic ones to make the point, 
although one could list more: for example, according to new industrial economics 
behavioral approach, barriers to entry may be defined as absolute/natural or strategic and 
then divided between those that stem from endogenous sunk costs and those from 
exogenous sunk costs
211
. 
The Bainian (from economist J. Bain) approach to barriers to entry regards 
qualifying barriers to entry as market factors that deterred entry even if the firms already 
in the market were charging prices above the competitive level
212
. For example, a Bainian 
definition would define economies of scale as an entry barrier. Scale economies entail 
that a firm contemplating entry must always consider, not merely the cost of producing, 
but also the cost of acquiring enough sales to make its own entry into the market 
profitable. If economies of scale are substantial, a dominant firm may be able to set a 
price above its costs and earn profits without causing new entry, for the residual market 
will not be large enough for a new firm to bring its costs down to the same level. 
This position is not shared by the Stiglerian approach (from economist G. Stigler) 
to the definition of barriers to entry. For Stigler and the libertarian Chicago school, the 
notion that economies of scale can be entry barriers seems irrational, because scale 
economies are themselves a form of efficiency
213
. The consideration of scale economies 
as barriers to entry will make efficiency an antitrust offense. Largely for these reasons, 
Stigler defines barriers to entry as “a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) 
which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms 
already in the industry”214. Concerning scale economies, it is clear that the costs for these 
are borne by firms already in the industry, therefore they should not be considered as 
barriers to entry. A Stiglerian perspective suggests more permissive antitrust standards 
than Bain’s definition215, as potential competition is socially desirable only if the new 
entrant has at least identical cost functions to the incumbent. Critical to Stigler’s 
argument is the assumption of credit easiness. He questioned Bain’s appeal to 
imperfections in the capital market that would have eliminated the possibility of new as 
efficient as potential entrants to finance their investments up to the point where they 
would benefit from equivalent scale economies to these of a dominant firm. Stigler 
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thought that large investment requirements could not impede the plans of a new firm to 
enter the market, given the wide range funding options in financial and credit markets. Is 
this assumption still valid in an era of the credit crunch?  
It is thus clear that the choice of one or another definition of barrier to entry by a 
legal system is function of the values/preferences of this specific system regarding 
“efficiency” or openness and market access as well as basic assumptions on the ability of 
firms to get the necessary credit to fund their entry into the market.  
The case law of the courts in the US has been ambiguous regarding the definition 
of barriers to entry
216
. Some US circuit courts of appeal have followed a Stiglerian 
approach
217
, when others, have followed a definition close to Bain
218
 and finally some are 
inspired by both definitions
219
. In Europe, the courts have used the expression in various 
settings. There is not an authoritative definition of the concept in EC competition law 
although in United Brands the Court included economies of scale as an example of 
barriers to entry, thus following a Bainian definition
220
. The variety of the possible 
approaches to the definition of barriers to entry led the European Commission to adopt in 
its vertical restraints guidelines a position which seems closer to that defended by J. Bain: 
“Entry barriers are measured by the extent to which incumbent companies can 
increase their price above the competitive level, usually above minimum average 
total cost, and make supra-normal profits without attracting entry”221. 
At the same time, however, the Commission accommodated new industrial economic 
literature by introducing an additional requirement for the qualification of entry barrier: 
“The question whether certain of these factors should be described as entry 
barriers depends on whether they are related to sunk costs. Sunk costs are those 
costs that have to be incurred to enter or be active on a market but that are lost 
when the market is exited. Advertising costs to build consumer loyalty are 
normally sunk costs, unless an exiting firm could either sell its brand name or use 
it somewhere else without a loss”222. 
The most recent Commission’s Guidance on its Enforcement priorities in Article 82 
explicitly cites economies of scale and scope as examples of barrier to entry. 
                                                 
216
 G.J.Werden, ‘Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case’ (2001) 69 
Antitrust L J 87-111, at 103-109. 
217
 E.g. Advo Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1200-1202 (3d Cir. 1995). 
218
 E.g. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969); Jefferson Parish 
Hospital District N° 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 n° 19, 14 (1984); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059 (8
th
 
Cir. 2000) 
219
 Rebel Oil. Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1439 (9
th
 Cir 1995), “entry barriers are additional 
long-run costs that were not incurred by incumbent firms but must be incurred by new entrants, or factors 
in the market that deter entry while permitting incumbent firms to earn monopoly returns”; Accord W. 
Parcel Express v. UPS, 190 F.3d 974, 975 (9
th
 Cir. 1999). 
220
 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, para 122. 
221
 Guidelines on vertical restraints, above n 121, para. 126. 
222
 Ibid., para. 128. 
 47 
Interestingly, the Commission’s Guidance does not employ the factor of sunk costs as an 
indicator of barriers to entry, thus retreating from the view it had adopted in the vertical 
restraints guidelines
223
. This may be justified by recent economic thinking that had cast 
doubt on the factor of sunk costs
224
 and a more empirical turn in competition law 
discourse: indeed, the most recent OECD “Best Practices” report on barriers to entry 
completely sidelines the issue of the definition of barriers to entry and concludes that 
“what matters in actual cases is not whether an impediment satisfies this or that definition 
of an entry barrier, but rather the more practical questions of whether, when, and to what 
extent entry is likely to occur given the facts in each case”225.  
The economic transplant of barrier to entry aimed to maintain diversity in 
economic discourse. 
This does not however mean that economic transplants should lead to a static 
view of the translated scientific discourse. The dual nature of economic transplants 
guarantees that this will not be the case. The last part will conclude by developing some 
ideas on an interpretative theory that will preserve the specificities of economic 
transplants and will correspond to the paradigm of translation. 
 
III. “Beyond Babel”: legal and economic discourses in the age of “economic transplants” 
 
As Paul Ricoeur reminds us, the paradigm of translation is based on the principle 
of “linguistic hospitality”: “(w)e are called to make our language put on the stranger’s 
clothes at the same time as we invite the stranger to step into the fabric of our own 
speech”226.Yet translation should remain a mediation between two distinct communities 
that stay loyal to their own discourse while being open to the “betrayal” of translation. 
The risk for this delicate equilibrium is that of “hegemonic” or “deferent” translations. 
Establishing a diachronic dialectical interaction between the two discourses will preserve 
that from happening. 
 
A. The risk of “hegemonic” and “deferential”  translations227 
 
Hegemonic translations occur when the host legal system crystallizes existing 
economic discourse and adopts it regardless of the evolutionary potential of this discourse 
or the variety of this discourse in the foreign (economic) sub-system. In other words, the 
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legal system builds its own image of economic discourse, appropriates it and cuts any 
link that may exist with the evolution of the source language/discourse. 
One could consider that the concept of “economic law” in the European continental 
tradition is an illustration of hegemonic translations
228
. Economic law is the law of the 
market organization: a branch of law more than a medium of communication between 
legal and economic discourse, as the law and economics conceives itself. If one looks to 
the concept more closely, however, it will be clear that the concept of economic law 
involves some form of communication between law and economics. The main difference 
with law and economics is that this communication takes place only at the first translation 
of the economic concept into legal norm. The translation is domesticating the economic 
concept, which loses its distinctive character or its original nature and is crystallized into 
a term of the legal sub-system and subject to the auto-referential process of the later. This 
constitutive moment ends the effort of communication: once the economic discourse 
becomes legal discourse/norm, its origins are forgotten, it is interpreted as if it were any 
other form of legal discourse, without any particular attention to the concurrent evolution 
of the source concept in economic discourse. Most often, the translation effort involves 
the re-naming of the concept, so as to make even clearer the dissociation between the 
concept and its origins (domesticated translation). 
The concept of “free competition” in ordo-liberal thought is an illustration of this 
approach
229. If one reads Walter Eucken’s formulation of the principle in Foundations of 
Economics it is very clear that the concept is intrinsically linked to an atomistic 
conception of competition, based on the perfect competition model
230
. Renaming the 
concept to “free competition” ensures that the economic origins of the concept and its 
possible conceptual defects) will not haunt the legal interpretative effort, sapping the 
epistemic legitimacy and therefore the authority of legal discourse. One could indeed 
perceive economic law as being essentially historically trapped to the economic 
imaginary of its period of creation: a Pigouvian pre-1940 version of welfare economics 
before new challenges such as the “new welfare economics” of Hicks and Kaldor, which 
gained prominence in the 1940s, or the Coasian new institutional economics in the 1960s 
brought down the Pigouvian church
231
. A parallel criticism of hegemonic translation can 
be made to the law and economics movement pioneered, among others, by Judge Richard 
Posner, essentially an importation in legal discourse of a different economic paradigm 
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that of new welfare economics based on a Coasean framework, without any regard to 
criticisms and oppositions to that model in economic discourse. 
Deferential translations exist when the economic discourse is translated without any 
regard to the specific objectives of the legal system. For example a normative emphasis 
on economic efficiency only, without due regard on other objectives of the legal system, 
will render an unsatisfactory outcome, from a legitimacy point of view. The emphasis of 
economic analysis to economic efficiency may be understood from a methodological 
point of view. For example, the quest for respectability (and conceptual coherence was 
particularly influential in the decision by welfare economists to ignore any ethical, social, 
distributive or psychological dimensions in the progressive construction of their ideal 
model of homo economicus. Economists were aware that their approach was by definition 
incomplete and essentially a purely methodological decision, motivated by the logical 
positivism shift that attempted to conceive economics as a hard (natural) science
232
. 
“Style is often an appeal to authority”233. In contrast, legal discourse is by definition 
holist: it should incorporate all the dimensions of human existence if it is to be persuasive 
to the much broader group of constituents that it is addressed to. The translator should 
therefore be aware of the existence of areas of intranslability, precisely because of the 
different methodologies and, more specifically, audiences to which the rhetoric of law 
and the rhetoric of economics aim to. The translator should also be attentive to the 
conditions that make scientific discourse blossom: that is, its openness, dialogue and 
continuous critical self-assessment, which will be the topic of my last section. 
 
B. The need for a diachronic dialectic interaction between legal and economic 
discourses 
 
The dual nature of economic transplants and their potential impact on both legal and 
economic discourses should influence the choice of the method of interpretation that 
should be used to make them operational at the adjudicative stage, in different fact 
patterns and contexts. This method will be based on the default interpretation rule that the 
act of translation from economic to legal discourse maintains the economic nature of the 
concept and provides guidance to the interpreter to remain cognitively open to 
developments affecting the meaning and operation of this concept in economic discourse. 
In other words, the paradigm of translation, epitomized by the emergence of economic 
transplants, requires the establishment of a diachronic dialectic interaction between the 
legal and the economic discourses. A number of practical implications follow. 
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First, specialized tribunals or generalist tribunals with “opinion specialization”234 and 
a strong interdisciplinary capacity (clerks, research and documentation units) should be 
preferred in areas with economic transplants, in order to ensure that economic analysis 
will still permeate the application of economic transplants following their translation to 
legal discourse. In other words, specialized adjudication will avoid the “regression” to 
economic law and the epistemic asymmetry problem (between judges and “experts”) that 
could increase the risk of deferent translation from without (the judge appointed or party 
expert). This does not mean that economists, or other social scientists without legal 
training and experience, should be members of the judiciary. This could increase the risk 
of deferent translation from within (the judge may have an intellectual bias towards his 
discipline), unless they form part of a judicial panel along with legally trained or 
experienced judges.  
Second, particular attention should be brought to the conformity of interpretation with 
the preferences of the legal sub-system, in particular the consideration, in the effort of 
translation, of minority views in economic discourse, which may have been included by 
the policy maker in the design of the economic transplant. 
Third, authoritative and close-system definitions of economic transplants in hard legal 
texts should be avoided in order to limit the risk of crystallization of economic discourse 
and the consequent risk of regression towards “economic law”. This does not mean that 
hard texts, such as case law, cannot include references to economic transplants, but a 
particular effort should be made to establish a link with the guidelines that had first 
introduced these economic transplants, so as to emphasize the contingent and open to 
evolution character of their importation in legal discourse. This is of particular interest 
and importance, as economic orthodoxy can be questioned and economic discourse is 
currently undergoing an important shift
235
. 
 
Conclusion 
  
As a concluding point, I would like to refer to one of the characters of Umberto Eco’s 
novel The Name of the Rose (1983). The main topic of the book is that the context of 
interpretation matters as much as empirical and deductive reasoning: William of 
Baskerville makes a wide use of modern hermeneutics in attempting to solve the different 
murders occurring at the Benedictin monastery. But of particular interest, for our 
purposes, is the character of Salvatore. When Adso, who is the narrator in the book, first 
meets him he compares him to his image of a monster. He describes his face as a face put 
together with pieces from other people’s faces. What Salvatore speaks is not Latin or any 
language at all, “Salvatore spoke all languages, and no language”. He takes words 
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sometimes from one language and sometimes from another. Salvatore was actually not 
inventing his own sentences but using words he had heard in the past in different 
situations. The babel-esque mutterings of Salvatore could appear as an adequate 
metaphor for the monstrous appearance of economic transplants to the devotees of the 
pure economic and legal discourses.  
Yet, the emergence of economic transplants, as challenging as it may appear for the 
“familiar landmarks of our thought”, offers the chance of a deeper interaction between 
economics and the law. Economic transplants are concepts developed in economics that 
are translated in law at the doctrinal stage. Their role can be better understood if one 
thinks of them as illustrations of the shift towards the paradigm of translation. In contrast 
to the closed-system hermeneutics of the pure legal or economic discourse, the paradigm 
of translation aims to put these two communities of law and economics in a diachronic 
and dialectic interaction with each other. In contrast to the concept of economic law and 
to the law and economics movement, economic transplants are a hybrid style of talk, at 
the intersection of these two disciplines, evolving separately but also in congruence with 
each of them. Their interpretation should integrate the fact that they are the product of an 
act of translation: One could not expect that they are similar to the concept in their source 
language. Their subsequent interpretation and application should not also be cut off from 
the discourse of their community of origin. Lawyers and economists are therefore bound 
to work together in order to make sense of economic transplants. This is, after all, the 
main implication of the paradigm of translation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
